Case study: Safety standards on California utilities to prevent wildfires
This case study was written in response to this
call for proposals by Holden Karnofsky to inform possible safety standards on leading AI labs.
It represents ~65 hours of research, interviews, and writing. I am grateful to
Michael Wara
(Stanford Law School Senior Research Scholar and consultant for wildfire risk to the California
Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety),
Melissa Semcer (former Deputy
Director of Energy Safety and Principal at Climate Wildfire and Energy Strategies, LLC),
Tom Long
(Director of Legal Strategy at TURN), and
Marc Joseph (former shareholder
and President at
Adams, Broadwell, Joseph, & Cardozo
and my father) to allow me to interview them for this case study.
Background and overview
This case study investigates safety standards applied to investor-owned electrical companies
in California (‘utilities’) to reduce the risk of utility equipment igniting catastrophic
wildfires. California investor-owned utilities are regulated monopolies responsible for
purchasing and distributing electricity across the state. Three utilities cover most of the
state, with Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) being the largest.1
The field has many possible parallels to the current and possible future landscape for
frontier AI labs. Some possible similarities are listed below (though some may become
dissimilarities depending on how the AI field evolves).
- Catastrophic wildfire risk is posed by a small number of companies in California (three
utilities cover most of the state).2
- It is infeasible to fully eliminate catastrophic wildfire risk (at least in short-medium
term).
- The risk of catastrophic wildfires has quickly increased in the past two decades.
- During this time, risk levels and the individual sources of risk have been highly uncertain
(though they are better understood now).
- The cost and effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies has also been largely unclear.
- Safety standards partially resemble a licensing scheme, with approval based on a fairly
subjective evaluation across a wide range of metrics.
- Safety measures can accompany economic tradeoffs for the general public (namely higher
electricity rates).
- Reputational risks play an important factor for utilities, as the largest utilities are well
known by the general public and the risk posed by such companies is widely discussed in
California media and politics.
This case study aims to highlight examples of company actions and regulator successes and
challenges in this (potentially) similar environment, to help calibrate our expectations for
AI company behavior and the risks and opportunities for safety standard strategies.
Based on my research, the following features of safety standard development on California
utilities to prevent catastrophic wildfires should provide (further) caution for AI safety
standard setting:
This case study also explores possible benefits and challenges of several regulatory
strategies that could be relevant for the AI field.
Finally, the case study highlights:
Contents
This case study is structured as follows:
Bullet points with arrows next to them can be clicked to reveal additional detail.
The need for safety standards
Current standards
- The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is the primary regulator of utilities. In
2022, the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (‘Energy Safety’) was created outside of
the CPUC to oversee utility processes related to reducing wildfire risk.
- Core requirements for a safety certification include:
- an approved executive compensation structure that ties compensation to
safety performance.
This requirement is explained in more detail here.
- an annually approved Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP).
WMPs
“describe how the electrical corporation is constructing, maintaining, and operating its electrical
lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire.” WMP
evaluation also includes an assessment for a utility’s capacity to execute the plan.
The text box below provides more details about the WMP components.
- Demonstration of implementing its approved WMP, and board-of-director-level safety
reporting structure.
Key takeaways
Proactivity vs. reactivity
- When starting from a low base, creating and enforcing standards can be a lengthy process –
it took roughly 5-10+ years after it was clear that catastrophic risk was present and rising
for standards to be created and have a meaningful impact on all utilities. This point is summarized in the bullets below and explored in more detail in this text box.
- Until legislation required stricter regulation (particularly starting in 2017), regulators
lacked sufficient capacity and will to promptly impose rules in the face of opposition
from most utilities.
- Following legislation, it took several years to build internal regulatory structure and
expertise.
- For the first year or two under new regulatory structure, regulators approved safety plans
with serious deficiencies on the condition that utilities would build capacity for
improving safety over time.
Utility motives
- On its surface, the California utility market appears more likely than most capitalist
markets to be one in which companies prioritize public welfare, including for the following
reasons:
- Utilities have a highly regulated business model.
- Wildfire risk has become clear after utilities have caused deadly catastrophes.
- Utilities face significant reputational challenges. PG&E in particular has received
significant negative publicity for many years related to wildfires. Its employees live
among their customers, and according to one expert, employees have faced significant
safety concerns while in the field due to apparent threats from members of the general
public.
Activists and third parties
Regulatory structure, processes, and challenges
Influence of voluntary safety actions
Risk assessment
Audits and penalties
If you have any comments or questions about this case study, feel free to email me at coby.joseph@gmail.com.
1: This case study focuses on safety standards on the three largest utilities and may not
accurately represent standards applying to smaller utilities.↩ 2: This may or may not be a parallel to the AI field in the future.↩ 3: Katherine Blunt, California Burning, 2022. Page 268.↩ 8: Available in the ‘Approved 2023 Executive Compensation Guidelines – 11/28/22’ accessible
here↩ 9: Katherine Blunt, California Burning, 2022. Page 188.↩ 10: Available here, see Energy Safety’s 2020 Annual Reports on Compliance: PG&E – 2/24/23↩ 11: As it would increase the utility’s risk of being unable to recover money from the
California Wildfire Fund if it faced significant liability, likely raising its borrowing
costs and increasing the risk of future bankruptcy, as indicated to me by experts. ↩ 12: “PG&E 2023-25 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Revision Notice – 6/22/23” available here↩ 13: Katherine Blunt, California Burning, 2022. Page 151.↩